From:
 "Wathen, David (Atlanta)" <david.wathen@willistowerswatson.com>

 Subject:
 Updated Committee Meeting Materials

 Sent:
 Mon, 22 Apr 2019 15:57:56 -0500

 To:
 "Hiers, Angelia R. - VP & Chief Human Resources Officer" <hierar@jea.com>, "Maillis, Patricia L. - Director, Employee

 Services"
 <mailpl@jea.com>, "Strackbine, Scott I. - Compensation Specialist" <strasi@jea.com>

 Cc:
 "Deeb, Andrea (Atlanta)" <andrea.deeb@willistowerswatson.com>, "Hwang, Paul (Atlanta)"

 <paul.hwang@willistowerswatson.com>, "Meng, Patrick (Atlanta)" <Patrick.Meng@willistowerswatson.com>

 JEA Comp Committee
 Draft 4.22.19 v2.pdf

[External Email - Exercise caution. DO NOT open attachments or click links from unknown senders or unexpected email.]

Angie, Pat and Scott:

Attached is the updated committee meeting materials. We incorporated all of the edits we discussed on our last call. Please review and let us know if there are any additional changes.

Best regards,

David Wathen Senior Director, Rewards

Willis Towers Watson 5 Concourse Parkway (Please note new address and work phone number)

Atlanta, GA 30328 Work: 678.684.0751 Cell: 404.285.9848 Email: david.wathen@willistowerswatson.com

Visit Executive Pay Matters to stay up-to-date on developments, trends and issues in executive compensation and governance

Notice of Confidentiality

This email contains confidential material prepared for the intended addressees only and it may contain intellectual property of Willis Towers Watson, its affiliates or a third party. This material may not be suitable for, and we accept no responsibility for, use in any context or for any purpose other than for the intended context and purpose. If you are not the intended recipient or if we did not authorize your receipt of this material, any use, distribution or copying of this material is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please return it to the original sender with the subject heading "Received in error," then delete any copies.

You may receive direct marketing communications from Willis Towers Watson. If so, you have the right to opt out of these communications. You can opt out of these communications or request a copy of Willis Towers Watson's privacy notice by emailing <u>unsubscribe@willistowerswatson.com</u>.

This e-mail has come to you from Willis Towers Watson US LLC

Compensation Program Review – Discussion Document for Compensation Committee Meeting

Prepared for JEA

April 22, 2019

Discussion Draft

Table of Contents

| Section | Page |
|---|------|
| Introduction | 2 |
| Compensation Philosophy Review | 4 |
| Evolution of JEA's Compensation Program | 6 |
| CEO Competitive Market Pricing | 8 |
| Compensation Benchmarking Summary | 11 |
| Short-Term Incentive Plan Practices | 14 |
| Long-Term Incentive Plan Design | 22 |
| Proposed Compensation Adjustments | 29 |
| Modernizing Total Rewards | 33 |
| Appendix | 37 |

Introduction

Introduction Summary

- JEA engaged Willis Towers Watson ("WTW") to complete the following:
 - Conduct a competitive market assessment for JEA's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") position
 - Review JEA's competitive market assessments across all employee populations
 - Provide a summary of market practices related to short-term incentive plan design
 - Conduct a competitive market analysis of long-term incentive ("LTI") plan design practices and develop a proposed design
- WTW presented its initial findings to JEA's CEO, CFO and Human Resources team, and based on their feedback, this report includes the following:
 - Confirmation of JEA's current compensation philosophy
 - Review of the evolution of JEA's compensation programs
 - Analysis of the compensation variances for JEA's Appointed population
 - Analysis of the gaps to market for JEA's Appointed population and Bargaining Units
 - Proposed LTI plan design
 - Total rewards market best practices

Compensation Philosophy Review


Compensation Philosophy Review JEA's Current Compensation Philosophy

 The following table summarizes JEA's current compensation philosophy, which guided WTW's review of JEA's competitive market assessments:

| Compensation Philosophy Element | Details |
|---|---|
| Alignment of Interest Between Employees, Stakeholders, and Organization | JEA's compensation philosophy should support the overall business and board strategy with the ultimate goal of driving performance of the organization |
| Market for Talent | JEA's geographic market for talent varies by job level: <u>Individual Contributors/Managers</u> – local and regional scope <u>Directors/Executives</u> – national scope |
| Target Competitiveness | Targets the market 50 th %ile for all pay elements |
| Pay Mix | JEA's pay mix currently consists of base salary and a short-term incentive award, but JEA is implementing a long-term incentive plan in 2020 to align the interests employees and stakeholders |
| Industry Perspectives | For <u>functional roles</u> – a 50/50 weighted mix of Utility/General Industry market data For <u>operational roles</u> – only Utility Industry market data |

Evolution of JEA's Compensation Program

Evolution of JEA's Compensation Program *Timeline of Goals and Major Changes*



CEO Competitive Market Pricing

CEO Competitive Market Pricing *Methodology*

 To conduct the competitive market pricing for the CEO position, a peer group was developed reflecting:

- Survey source: Willis Towers Watson's 2018 Energy Services Industry Executive Compensation Database
- Target TDC for the Combined Peer Group perspective is built up by using this formula:

CEO Competitive Market Pricing *Market Pricing Details*

| Chief Executive Officer | | Compe | titive Marke | t Data ⁽⁵⁾ |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------|--------------|-----------------------|
| Pay Component | Data Perspective | 25th %ile | 50th %ile | 75th %ile |
| | Combined Peer Group | | | |
| Base (\$000s) | Investor Owned Utility Peers | | | |
| | Public Power Peers | | | |
| | Combined Peer Group | | | |
| Target Bonus % ⁽¹⁾ | Investor Owned Utility Peers | | | |
| | Public Power Peers (3) | | | |
| | Combined Peer Group | | | |
| Target TCC (\$000s) | Investor Owned Utility Peers | | | |
| | Public Power Peers | | | |
| | Combined Peer Group | | | |
| LTI % ⁽²⁾ | Investor Owned Utility Peers | | | |
| | Public Power Peers | | | |
| | Combined Peer Group (4) | | | |
| Target TDC (\$000s) | Investor Owned Utility Peers | | | |
| | Public Power Peers | | | |

"---"= Data not available.

(1) Target bonus percentages are represented as a percentage of base salary.

(2) Long-term incentive (LTI) percentages are represented as a percentage of base salary. LTI figures are based on ASC 718 (FAS 123R) "accounting values".

(3)

(4) Target TDC for the Combined Peer Group perspective is built up by using Base Salary, Target TCC, and LTI % data.

(5) Market data greater than \$100,000 rounded to the nearest \$5,000.

Compensation Benchmarking Summary

Compensation Benchmarking Summary *Methodology*

- The following page contains a summary of WTW's review of JEA's competitive market data for its Appointed population (including 13 executives)
- WTW reviewed the most current incumbent and market data provided by JEA
 - Market data for the positions below the Director-level reflect a -5% geographic differential to account for the cost of labor of Jacksonville, FL vs. the US national average
 - Analysis of competitive positioning focused on market data at the 50th percentile

Compensation Benchmarking Summary

Appointed Population vs. Market 50th Percentile Variances By Job Level

- The following exhibits summarize variances comparing incumbent pay data with market data from job weighted and incumbent weighted perspectives for the <u>Appointed</u> <u>population only</u>
- Variances are similar for both perspectives, and are lower to market for executives and directors at target bonus %, target TCC, and target TDC compared to the other job levels

Job Weighted:

| Level | Average Base Salary Variance | Average Target Bonus % Absolute Variance | Average Target TCC Variance | Average Long-term Incentive % Absolute Variance | Average Target TDC Variance |
|------------------------|---------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| Executive | -12% | -33% | -28% | | -42% |
| Director | -1% | -10% | -8% | | -13% |
| Manager | -2% | -5% | -6% | | -6% |
| Individual Contributor | -1% | -2% | -1% | | -1% |
| Total | -2% | -7% | -6% | | -7% |

Incumbent Weighted:

| Level | Average Base Salary Variance | Average Target Bonus % Absolute Variance | Average Target TCC Variance | Average Long-term Incentive % Absolute Variance | Average Target TDC Variance |
|------------------------|---------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| Executive | -12% | -33% | -28% | | -42% |
| Director | 0% | -10% | -7% | | -12% |
| Manager | -3% | -5% | -6% | | -6% |
| Individual Contributor | 0% | -2% | 1% | | 1% |
| Total | -2% | -5% | -4% | | -6% |

Short-Term Incentive Plan Practices

Short-Term Incentive Plan Practices Introduction

- JEA re-instated a broad-based short-term incentive plan several years ago, both to address competitive pay levels, as well as to reinforce specific messages related to performance expectations
- The following pages summarize market practices related to short-term incentive plan design
 - As appropriate, JEA may consider these practices as they continue to evolve their incentive plan design
 - Key design features covered include eligibility, target award opportunities, payout ranges, bonus pool funding, performance measures and performance range
- The market practices information has been summarized from survey research, as well as our consulting experiences

Short-Term Incentive Plan Practices Eligibility

- Eligibility for short-term incentive plans is typically broad for both the Utility and General Industries, with prevalence actually higher in the Utility Industry (particularly at the lower job levels)
- Over 60% of organizations extend eligibility to the lower exempt and non-exempt roles
 - Lower roles may not have an expressed target opportunity, but they may be part of a "sharing program" based on organizational performance
 - In some cases, overall funding and participation at lower levels may be discretionary

Short-Term Incentive Plan Practices *Target Incentive Award Opportunities*

- Target incentive opportunities typically increase with job level, and are relatively similar in both the Utility and General Industries
- Note that we have recommended STI targets as part of our analysis to "close the gap" between market and JEA's desired competitive positioning

| | Target STI Opportunities | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|--|
| Role/Career Level | Utilities | General Industry | |
| Senior Directors | | | |
| Managers | | | |
| Supervisors | | | |
| Senior Level Professionals | | | |
| Entry-Mid Level Professionals | | | |
| Non-exempt | | | |

Target Incentive Award Opportunities - By Job Level

Source: Willis Towers Watson 2018 General Industry and Energy Services MMPS Compensation Survey Reports – U.S.

Short-Term Incentive Plan Practices Payout Ranges

- Payout ranges reflect the total award opportunity as a percentage of the target award, and represent the minimum award opportunity if threshold performance is achieved, and the maximum opportunity if maximum performance is achieved
- Payout ranges are typically 50% of target at threshold performance and 200% of target at maximum performance
- In most cases (and based on the specific performance standards), organizations will interpolate actual performance between threshold, target and maximum to provide appropriate incentive to improve performance at every possible increment
- Note that it is important to calibrate the payout range with the performance range to ensure that the awards are aligned with the probability of achievement

Short-Term Incentive Plan Practices Bonus Pool Funding

- There are two primary approaches to determine bonus pool funding:
 - 1. <u>Sum-of-targets</u>: specific target opportunities are defined (typically by role or grade) and the sum of these targets determines the bonus "pool" (the aggregated award which would be generated at target performance)
 - 2. <u>Financial results-based formula</u>: typically a financially-driven formula (e.g., bonus pool equals 10% of profits above a specific threshold)
- The sum-of-targets approach is typically the most common in both the Utility and General Industries
 - Prevalence for financial results-based formulas increases slightly for broad-based plans that are separate from executive plans because there is often a greater requirement that they be selffunding
- Particularly for sum-of-target plans, circuit breakers are a common design feature
 - A circuit breaker represents a single performance measure (typically a financial measure) that must be reached before any incentive award is paid regardless of performance in other measures
 - In other words, if the circuit breaker financial performance isn't achieved, it shuts down the entire plan regardless of performance on other performance measures
 - Note that a financial circuit breaker may be set at levels below threshold levels for payout
- Another design feature is a modifier, which can be used to adjust the initial funding up or down based on another important measure (e.g. determine pool based on financial performance, and then modify by operational or customer performance measures)

Short-Term Incentive Plan Practices

Performance Measures

- Performance measures send an important message about what an organization must achieve, and how individual employees can contribute to those objectives
- We consider it a best practice to have a portfolio of performance measures to balance expectations across financial, operational and customer service categories
 - However, in order to ensure appropriate focus, we typically see 4-6 performance measures, with each measure having at least a 10% weight
- It is typical for organizations in both Utility and General Industry to include at least one profit or income measure, with <u>profit/operating income</u> being the most common in both industries
- For non-financial performance measures, <u>environmental health and safety</u>, as well as <u>operating/strategic measures</u> are the most common in the Utility Industry
- Individual performance measures are also common in the Utility and General Industries
 - These measures help create line-of-sight to broader corporate measures

Short-Term Incentive Plan Practices *Performance Range*

- Performance ranges reflect the minimum acceptable performance as a percentage of target performance, and the maximum performance recognized as a percentage of target performance
- Narrow performance ranges are typically used for measures where results are not expected to vary significantly from target (e.g., revenues)
- Wider performance ranges are typically used for measures where performance can fluctuate significantly year to year (e.g., profitability)
- In the Utility Industry, performance ranges for profitability at minimum is typically set to be 90% of target and for maximum is typically set to be 115% of target
- An important consideration in establishing the performance range is the probability of achievement
 - A best practice is to set threshold performance goals where the probability of achievement is 80-90% to ensure appropriate motivation
 - Similarly, probability of achievement for target performance should be 50-60% and 10-20% for maximum performance
 - As noted earlier, it is important to calibrate the performance range with the payout range

Long-Term Incentive Plan Design

Long-Term Incentive Plan Design Introduction

| Why Companies Have Long-Term Incentive Plans | Factor Driving JEA Inclusion of LTI |
|---|--|
| Focus on long-term performance and align performance to long-term business strategies | \checkmark |
| Necessary component of a market competitive compensation program for investor owned utilities | \checkmark |
| Aligns the interests of employees with stakeholders | \checkmark |
| Fosters long-term retention | \checkmark |
| Encourages teamwork and collaboration across groups, functions, businesses, etc. | \checkmark |
| Rewards for long-term shareholder/stakeholder value creation | \checkmark |
| Balances focus on short-term results that are driven by annual incentives | \checkmark |

Long-Term Incentive Plan Design Market Practices Summary

| Design Aspect | Public Power Utilities | Investor Owned Utility (IOU) Peer Group | Broader Utility Industry | |
|--|--|---|---|--|
| Prevalence | LTI plans are uncommon, but used selectively | All 13 IOU peers have an LTI plan | LTI plans are very prevalent with almost all IOUs using an LTI plan | |
| Eligibility | For those Public Power Utilities with an LTI plan, eligibility typically limited to select executives | Typically executives down to director level positions | Typically executives down to director level positions | |
| Target Opportunity (% of Base Salary) | Varies widely based on the organization, but targets will be lower than IOU levels | Median for CEOs: 230% Median for NEOs*: 110% Median for Directors: NA | | |
| Award Frequency | Annual awards with overlapping cycles are most common | All 13 peers grant annual awards with overlapping cycles | | |


NEOs* = Named Executive Officers, as disclosed in the IOU's proxy statement.

Long-Term Incentive Plan Design Market Practices Summary (continued)

| Design Aspect | Public Power Utilities | Investor Owned Utility (IOU) Peer Group | Broader Utility Industry | |
|--------------------------------|--|---|--------------------------|--|
| Award Vehicles | Cash-based performance plans | 100% of peers use performance plans 69% use restricted stock No peers use stock options | | |
| Performance Metrics | Financial and operational | TSR (100%) EPS (38%) Operational (15%) | | |
| Performance Metrics Weights | Operational metrics weighted more heavily than financial metrics | TSR and financial metrics weighted more heavily than operational metrics | Not available | |
| Performance Range | More conservative compared to IOUs | Relative TSR: 28 th %ile at threshold, 50 th %ile at target, and 90 th %ile at maximum | | |
| Payout Range | Threshold: 50% of Target Maximum: 150% of Target | Threshold: 0-50% of Target Maximum: 150-200% of Target | | |

Long-Term Incentive Plan Design Proposed Design

 Given consideration of the overarching goal to allow all employees the opportunity to share in the long-term success of the company, we propose a multi-pronged LTI design approach below:



* Value of units tied to JEA Net Book Value.

Long-Term Incentive Plan Design Proposed Design Details: Performance Unit

Performance Unit

| Plan Design Element | Plan Design Details | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|
| Award Vehicle | Performance Unit: value of unit tied to JEA Net Book Value; unit valuation formula to be determined | | | |
| Eligibility | All employees would be eligible in order to drive collective focus on JEA long-term performance | | | |
| Target Award Opportunity (as % of base salary) | Award opportunities vary based on level in the organization (see page 31 for proposed targets); intent is to close competitive gap to market for LTI over 2 to 3 years. Proposed targets are intended to keep JEA compensation competitive with market 50 th percentile | | | |
| Award Frequency | Annual | | | |
| Circuit Breaker | Defined level of contribution to the City will be established for each award cycle; intent is for contribution level to ensure LTI plan is self funded | | | |
| Performance Measures | Net Book Value: used to determine Performance Unit value Customer Rates: performance measure used to modify the number of Performance Units earned; performance goal to be determined | | | |
| Performance Period | 3-year performance cycle with overlapping cycles due to annual grant frequency 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Award Payout | | | |
| Payout Range | Threshold: 50% of Target Maximum: 150% of Target | | | |
| Estimated Cost | Estimated cost of annual Performance Unit awards to all employees based on current incumbent base salaries* is \$4M | | | |

*Bargaining Unit costs calculated based on step structure data if incumbent data are not available.

Long-Term Incentive Plan Design Proposed Design Details: Time-Based Unit

Time-Based Unit

| Plan Design Element | Plan Design Details |
|--|--|
| Award Vehicle | • Time-Based Unit: value of unit tied to JEA Net Book Value; unit valuation formula to be determined |
| Eligibility | All employees eligible, but awards targeted to critically skilled employees or employees viewed as retention risk; awards generally intended for Manager level positions and below in order to enhance employee retention Target 10% of employees below the Director level (approximately 1,500 including Bargaining Units) or approximately 150 employees below the Director level to receive awards each year |
| Target Award Opportunity (as % of base salary) | Retention award values range from 10% to 20% depending on criticality of role and/or retention need |
| Award Pool Funding | Defined level of contribution to the City will be established each year with intent for contribution level to ensure LTI plan, covering both Performance Unit and Time-Based Unit awards, is self funded |
| Award Frequency | Ad hoc awards |
| Vesting Period | 3-year cliff vesting period |
| Estimated Cost | Estimated cost of annual Time-Based Unit awards to employees below the Director level based on current incumbent base salaries* is \$1.2M |

*Bargaining Unit costs calculated based on step structure data if incumbent data are not available.

Competitive Pay Gaps to Market by Pay Element

- The following exhibit summarizes the current gaps to market for JEA's population (excluding the M&C roles due to lack of incumbent data) by each pay element:
 - JEA's base salary, target TCC, and target TDC show variances comparing incumbent pay to market for the Appointed population
 - Bargaining Units' pay elements and JEA target bonus % are based off of pay structures (many of the Bargaining Units are in step structures)
- Gaps to market exist at target bonus % and long-term incentive %, particularly for the executives and directors, which lead to higher variances to market at target TCC and target TDC

| Level | Average Base Salary/Midpoint Variance | Average Target Bonus % | | Average Target TCC Variance | Average L Incent | | Average Target TDC Variance |
|------------------------|---|------------------------|--------|--------------------------------|---------------------|--------|--------------------------------|
| | JEA | JEA | Market | JEA | JEA | Market | JEA |
| Executive | -12% | 10% | | -28% | | | -42% |
| Director | -1% | 8% | | -8% | | | -13% |
| Manager | -2% | 7% | | -6% | | | -6% |
| Individual Contributor | -1% | 6% | | -1% | | | -1% |
| Bargaining Units | 11% | 2% | | 8% | | | 8% |
| Total | 3% | 5% | | -1% | | | -2% |

Job Weighted:

Note: Market data provided by JEA.

Proposed Base Salary, Target Bonus and Long-Term Incentive Adjustments

- Base Salary: assess individual competitive position to market; for individual positions well below market, JEA should bring positions to within the competitive range of the market median within two to three years, assuming that performance expectations are being met
- Target Bonus % and LTI % (as % of salary): the tables below summarize JEA's current average target bonus and LTI incentive opportunities and WTW's proposed target values
 - The proposed incentive adjustments are intended to partially close the gap to market with the intent of moving to market within two to three years, depending on market movement

| | Target Bonus % | | | LTI Opportunity % | | | Total At Risk Compensation | | |
|------------------------|----------------|--------|----------|-------------------|--------|----------|----------------------------|--------|----------|
| Level | Current | Market | Proposed | Current | Market | Proposed | Current | Market | Proposed |
| Executive | 10% | | 20% | | | 30% | 10% | | 50% |
| Director | 8% | | 10% | | | 15% | 8% | | 25% |
| Manager | 7% | | 7% | | | 3% | 7% | | 10% |
| Individual Contributor | 6% | | 7% | | | 3% | 6% | | 10% |
| Bargaining Units | 2% | | = | | | 1% | 2% | | 3% |

- Estimated Cost Impact: the estimated <u>incremental</u> cost impact of the proposed target bonus and LTI adjustments are as follows:
 - Target Bonus Cost: \$400K based off current incumbent base salaries
 - LTI Cost: \$4M based off current incumbent base salaries for performance unit award (\$5.2M if time-based unit award is included)

Note: Market data provided by JEA.

Market Positioning Based on Proposed Pay Adjustments


- The following exhibit summarizes the competitive position of JEA pay based on WTW's proposed target bonus % and LTI % adjustments
 - JEA's competitive position to market improves at all levels with Executive level competitive gap to market target TDC cut in half
 - While a competitive gap to market for executives at target TCC and target TDC still exists, applicable base salary adjustments and multi-year approach for adjusting target bonus and LTI plan will close the gap
 - All levels except for executives at target TCC and all levels at target TDC fall within the competitive range of market (defined as +/-15% for target TCC and +/-20% for target TDC)

| Level | Average Base Salary/Midpoint Variance | Average Tar | get Bonus % | Proposed Target TCC Variance | Average Long-term Incentive % | | Proposed Target TDC Variance | |
|------------------------|---|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------|--|
| | JEA | JEA Proposed | Market | JEA | JEA Proposed | Market | JEA | |
| Executive | -12% | 20% | | -22% | 30% | | -20% | |
| Director | -1% | 10% | | -6% | 15% | | 1% | |
| Manager | -2% | 7% | | -6% | 3% | | 0% | |
| Individual Contributor | -1% | 7% | | -1% | 3% | | 5% | |
| Bargaining Units | 11% | 2% | | 8% | 1% | | 9% | |
| Total | 3% | 6% | | 0% | 4% | | 4% | |

Job Weighted:

Note: Market data provided by JEA.

Integrated Total Rewards strategy, architecture & design and delivery for a superior Talent Value Proposition




Source: 2018 Willis Towers Watson Modernizing Total Rewards Survey

Key themes emerging in the market with implications for Total Rewards



Our findings identify five areas critical to meeting employees' Total Rewards expectations and delivering a consumer-grade experience



Source: 2018 Willis Towers Watson Modernizing Total Rewards Survey

Appendix

Appendix CEO Competitive Market Pricing Utility Peer Group

| Organization | Ticker | Revenues (\$MMs) | Generation | | Characteristics | | | | |
|-----------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|--|--|
| | | | Capacity (MW) | Туре | Generation | Transmission | Distribution | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| EA | Public Power | \$1,790 | 3,330 | Diversified | Х | Х | Х | | |
| Percentile Rank | | 60% | 45% | | | | | | |
| | | | | 2 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

Appendix Incentive Plan Review Methodology

- The competitive market review of short and long-term incentive plan design practices covered the following:
 - Utility and General Industry market best practices were considered
 - Peer group reflecting a mix of Public Power Utilities and comparably-sized IOUs was developed for the LTI plan design review
- Sources:
 - WTW's 2018 General Industry and Energy Services Executive Compensation Survey Report
 - WTW's 2018 General Industry and Energy Services MMPS Compensation Survey Report
 - WTW's 2018 Long-Term Incentives Policies and Practices Survey Report General and Utility Industries data cuts
 - WTW's 2018 Global Executive Incentive Design Survey
 - Consulting experience with broad-based and executive compensation practices in both the Utility and General Industries

Appendix LTI Plan Design Review Utility Peer Group

IOUs (13 Companies)

- ALLETE
- Alliant Energy
- Avista
- Black Hills
- El Paso Electric
- Hawaiian Electric Industries
- NorthWestern Energy
- OGE Energy
- Otter Tail
- Pinnacle West Capital
- PNM Resources
- Portland General Electric
- Vectren

Public Power Utilities

- Six public power utility clients
- Anecdotal consulting experience